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it is settled that the federal courts have power to discharge a prisoner from the custody
of a state court in order to protect his rights under the federal Constitution, 6 such
power should be employed only in the exercise of a "sound discretion,"7 since it interferes with the orderly processes of the state courts. 8 Inasmuch as state courts are
equally charged with the duty of complying with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 9 only judgments in clear violation of its requirements should be
set aside by the federal courts.20 Moreover, in the instant case one of the conditions of
the petitioner's pardon was that he be "law-abiding"; as a matter of fact, when the
pardon was revoked he was under indictment for murder."
The principal case leaves unanswered the question as to what standard of hearing
will be deemed due process. The precise holding stipulated only that the executive
may not reserve the power to revoke a pardon without a hearing. It appears that a
reservation of power to revoke by executive order after a hearing would be sustained.
To what extent the executive's action must be in conformity with the weight of the
evidence introduced is not indicated. State courts have previously refused to review
the revocation of a conditional pardon where by its terms final determination rested
with the governor, on the ground that he would not be bound by such a review.22 If
the finding of the governor upon hearing is made conclusive regardless of the evidence
introduced, the sole result of the instant decision may be an added formality in the revocation procedure. The present decision may contemplate a review by the courts of
the executive's action, at least to determine whether that action, taken after a hearing,
was arbitrary.23
Income Taxes-Deductions-Expenditure to Affect Legislation Not Deductible[Federal].--In 1924 the taxpayer-respondent was employed by a large part of the German textile interests to secure reimbursement from Congress for property seized under
the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.1 The expenses of the undertaking were to be
borne by the taxpayer in return for a fee contingent upon the value of the property recovered. Pursuant to the contract the taxpayer hired a publicity organization, the
members of which wrote pamphlets, prepared news items and arranged for speeches
and editorial space. After the passage of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928,2
the taxpayer sought to deduct from its federal income tax return, as "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses, certain sums paid to the publicity organization. The
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the deductions were prohibited by the
treasury regulations as an expenditure for the "promotion or defeat of legislation."s
The Board of Tax Appeals reversed the ruling, on the ground that the treasury regulations did not apply and that the board had previously allowed similar deductions.4 On
appeal by the commissioner to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held,
that expenditures made in accordance with a contingent fee contract to promote the
passage of legislation cannot be deducted from gross income as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. Com'r v. Textile Mills Corp.s
Section 23a of the Revenue Act of 19286 permits deductions for "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses .... in carrying on any trade or business .... " While the
expenditure must be both "ordinary" and "necessary,"7 the term "necessary" has seldom occasioned any difficulty. It has been interpreted as not requiring anything more
than that the expenditure be "helpful" to the undertaking.8 The term "ordinary,"
while generally taken to mean that the expenditure must be in accord with business
conduct in similar enterprises,9 has been the source of much contention.10
What may be deducted is often defined more specifically in treasury regulations.
Thus a regulation under the Revenue Act of 1928 provides that "sums ....for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, the exploitation of propaganda ....
are not deductible ......,,'It is doubtful, however, whether this section has the force
of law, as against seemingly contrary decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals. It might
of course be argued that, because Congress has reenacted the statute several times since
the regulation first appeared in i92i, Congress has adopted the regulation as its own.1
However, since the quoted regulation appears in a section dealing with donations, its
application to deduction of business expenses is doubtful, and it might be said that the
resulting ambiguity prevents the operation of the reenactment rule.'s Moreover, the
3 Treas. Reg. 74, art.
4

262 (193I).

Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Com'r, 38 B.T.A. 623 (1938).

s11r7 F. (2d)
645

62

(C.C.A. 3d i94o).

Stat. 799 (1928).
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interpretations of the Board of Tax Appeals are also regarded as evidence of the administrative construction of the statute,4 and their decisions, apparently contrary to the
regulation,s add further weight to the argument that Congress has not enacted the
regulation., 6 Finally, the statute may be construed as giving the commissioner a mere
fact-finding power as to what is "ordinary and necessary" in particular cases, with no
intention on the part of Congress to adopt any administrative fact determination.'7
Because of the uncertainty as to the status and effect of treasury regulations, the
deductibility of propaganda expenditures probably must be determined by applying
the words of the statute itself. Expenditures for purposes which are said to violate
public policy have often been taxed on the ground that they are not "ordinary" expenses. The public policy test of deductibility has met with serious criticism, much of
it similar to criticism levied against the use of income tax evasion to enforce the criminal law.'8 It is a test interpolated into a statute otherwise silent on the subject. In
addition to the vagueness of the test the determination as to what is desirable policy is
hardly within the scope of the judicial procedure.
While lobbying expenditures have generally been held to be against public policy,9
as tending to interfere with freedom of legislative action, deductions of expenditures
designed to influence legislation have been permitted by both the'Board of Tax Appeals and the federal courts2 0 Thus assessments paid to a trade association to publicize
X4Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455 (1934); see Biddle v. Com'r, 302 U.S.
582 (1938).
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views concerning pending legislation affecting the taxpayer have been held deductible."
It would seem that the deduction might equally well have been allowed in the instant
case.22 There was no personal solicitation of legislators, 2 3 the expenditure was ordinary

in the taxpayer's business, and the consequences were obviously a "direct" benefit to
the taxpayer.24 True, in the trade association cases the taxpayer spends his funds incidentally to another, judicially approved enterprise, while in the instant case the taxpayer's whole business was the procurement of legislation.s But the statute allows deductions in "any trade or business"; 26 and in view of the fact that social scientists
usually agree that some organized method of persuasion is inevitable in a democracy,
21Payments of dues to trade associations which maintain a constant vigilance over any
legislation have been held deductible. Goulds v. Mersereau Co., Inc., 21 B.T.A. 316 (1931);
Appeal of California Brewing Ass'n, 5 B.T.A. 347 (1926).
In the early twenties the American Association of Railroad Executives raised $r,ooo,ooo
through assessment of railroad corporations to conduct a gigantic advertising campaign, in an
effort to win public favor and promote "sound national legislation" regarding transportation.
Deductions for this assessment were constantly allowed both by the Board of Tax Appeals
and the lower federal courts. Texas &P. R. Co. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 1040 (Ct. Cl. 193 1);
Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Com'r, 18 B.T.A. 168 (1929); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Com'r,
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Nicholson v. Com'r, 38 B.T.A. 190 (1938); Easton Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Com'r,
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hosiery industry is evidently a "direct" benefit (Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Com'r, 6 B.T.A.
1247 (1927)), but not so if the contributor would benefit simply from the general prosperity in

the protected area (Kirby v. Com'r, 35 B.T.A. 578 (I937)). Sometimes the expenses for
lobbying which was probably improper have been taxed not because of impropriety but on the
ground that no showing of a business benefit had been made. Adler Co. v. Com'r, ioB.T.A.
849 (1928); Appeal of Cavanaugh, 2 B.T.A. 268 (1925). In the majority opinion in the instant case, for instance, the court questioned (apparently seriously) whether the expenditure
had benefited the taxpayer. Com'r v. Textile Securities Corp., 117 F. (2d) 62, 65-66 (C.C.A.
3d 194o).
"5If the identity of lobbyists is concealed from the legislators, the arrangement is very likely
against public policy. Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., i6 How. (U.S.) 314 (1853). A
fortiori if the identity of the agents is concealed from the tax authorities the deduction is disallowed. Appeal of National Concrete Co., 3 B.T.A. 777 (i926). There is a kind of concealment in the present case insofar as the taxpayer inspired news stories and editorials whose
source would remain unknown to the reader. Yet in political discussion are not the sources of
information and argument usually partisan?
2645 Stat. 799 § 23(a) (1928). Not all recognized means of gaining a livelihood are business
enterprises within the meaning of the statute. David A. Reed v. Com'r, 13 B.T.A. 513 (1928)
(campaign expenses of candidate for United States Senate not deductible because running for
office is not a "trade or business").
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the circumstance that the taxpayer's entire business was persuasion should not prevent
the deduction. Furthermore, the work of the taxpayer was part of a general plan whereby war-confiscated property claims in Germany and the United States had been compromised. 27 Such an agreement would seem to be of such public usefulness that expenses toward its execution should not be penalized in any way.
Also, in the instant case, it was said that the deduction could not be allowed because the expenditure was made in pursuance of a contract which was itself contrary
to public policy.28 Not only may the use of this argument be criticized on the ground
that refusal of the deduction is not a proper means of enforcing the policy, but it may
also be objected to because it is not at all clear that the contract was against public
policy. If, under Erie v. Tompkins, state law is applicable,29 the federal courts are faced
with a variety of state decisions,30 some of them holding that contingent fee contracts
for lobbying are void,3' others holding that the contracts are valid unless there is proof
that improper acts were actually contemplated or done.32 Under the federal decisions,
there is an equal lack of uniformity.33 Usually, where there has been personal contact
with individual legislators, the contract is held void. Yet in one case the court allowed
quasi-contractual relief to lobbyists for the Choctaw Indians in spite of the fact that
the claimants engaged in all types of lobbying activity, including personal solicitation.34
If personal solicitation does not render the contract void, it would seem that, a fortiori,
a contract for the type of activity involved in the instant case would be enforcible.
One court, recognizing the confusion of the precedents, sought to harmonize the cases
on the basis that seeking "debt" legislation was proper but seeking "favor" legislation
17, 70th Cong., ist Sess. (1927).
In Easton Tractor &Equipment Co., Inc. v. Com'r, 35 B.T.A. I89 (1936), a similar theory
was employed in denying the deduction.
29 State law, especially with reference to the definition of interests in real property, has often
been applied in federal taxation cases. Paul, The Effect on Federal Taxation of Local Rules of
Property, in Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (1938); Waller v. Com'r, 4o F. (2d) 892
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of the Supreme Court, however, has been to rely upon the general type of economic interest,
rather than the technicalities of property law, and thereby to avoid the application of state
law. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 55, (1933).
30 Contracts-Validity of Lobbying Contracts, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 163 (1930); 45 Yale L. J.
731 (1936); Right to Recover Compensation for Services Rendered under a Lobbying Con-

tract, 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 4o1 (193o).
31Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 6 How. (U.S.) 314 (1853); Hazelton v. Shockells,
202 U.S. 71 (19o6); Richardson v. Scott's Bluff County, 59 Neb. 400, 81 N.W. 309 (1899);

Coquillard's Adm'r v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479 (1863).
32 State v. Okanogan County, 153 Wash. 399, 280 Pac. 31 (1929); Parkey v. Brock, 222 Ky.
34, 299 S.W. xo6i (1927); Denison v. Crawford County, 48 Iowa 211 (1878); Hunt v. Test,
8 Ala. 545 (1845).
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Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927), Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1921), Valdes v. Larrinaga,
233 U.S. 705 (1914), and Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12 (igo6).
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was not35 Debt legislation was defined as that designed to satisfy a claim against the
government while favor legislation grants some special private or group benefit from
the state. The term "claim" is of course ambiguous, but it would seem that while the
German interests had no "property" in the confiscated items,36 they certainly had
some moral ground for reimbursement.

Labor Law-Picketing-Injunction against Picketing Blended with Violence[Federa.--The petitioner, a Chicago dairy company, employed the "vendor" system, for the distribution of its product. In an endeavor to compel the unionization of
those employed in the distribution system, the defendant union attempted to negotiate with the petitioner. The failure of these efforts occasioned a wave of violence, following which the union established placard-carrying patrols of one or two men before
shops retailing the petitioner's products. Although no violence took place on the picket
lines, sporadic acts of violence continued elsewhere. After a hearing on a petition for an
injunction, the master recommended that all picketing as well as violent acts be enjoined. The trial court enjoined the violence but specifically exempted peaceful picketing from the scope of the injunction. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded, directing a permanent injunction as recommended by the master.' On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, that the decree did not violate the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in enjoining acts of picketing in
themselves peaceful when "enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct." Injunction upheld, Justices Black, Reed, and Douglas dissenting. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Iw. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union.3
The principal case might well be considered a foreseeable consequence of Thornhill
v. Alabama.4 Mr. Justice Murphy there indicated rather vague limits to the protection
afforded picketing as an exercise of the right to freedom of speech.5 His criteria, "the
clear danger of substantive evils" and "the interests of society," appear to accord with
prevailing notions as to the limitations on freedom of speech in general. 6 Not until the
principal case, however, has the Court indicated what circumstances and conditions
3s Gesellschaft fik Drahtlose Telegraphie, M.B.H. v. Brown, 64 App. D.C. 357, 78 F. (2d)
410 (1935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 618 (1935); Brown v. Gesellschaft ffir Drahtlose Telegraphie,
M.B.H., 70 App. D.C. 94, 1o4 F. (2d) 227 (1939), cert. den. 307 U.S. 64o (i939).
36 Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Discontogesellschaft, 30o U.S. iiS (1937).
xA "vendor" uses his own truck for delivery of milk which he purchases directly from
dairies for resale to retailers, the dairies repurchasing from him all unsold milk. Since vendors
work longer hours and earn less than union members, the use of the vendor system has enabled
retailers to sell milk for less than milk distributed door-to-door by union members. Competition
from sale of milk at a lower price in retail shops resulted in a decline in business for dairies employing union members and a consequent loss of union membership. See Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 9i, 95 (i94o).
'371 Il1. 377, 2r N.E. (2d) 308 (1939).
36i S. Ct. 552 (i941).
43IO U.S. 88 (i94o); cf. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. io6 (i94o).
5310 U.S. 88,
6 See
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Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (I940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
x6o (r939); cf. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 3io U.S. 586 (i94o).

